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tion as a going concern with the potential power of expansion has led to the elimination
of the arbitrary limitations on debts based on the paper value of the capital stock.
That the modern trend is not entirely away from debt limit restrictions seems to be
indicated in a recent SEC decision,3 suggesting that the approach to the problem
should be made, not in terms of an arbitrary limit, but in terms of preserving certain
ratios between debts and capital stock. In that case, the commission denied an appli-
cation for permission to issue bonds, partially on the basis that the proposed indebted-
ness of the corporation would result in a ratio of debts to common stock which would
exceed the prevailing ratio in the particular industry in which the applicant was
operating. The commission held that the issue was not appropriate to the economical
and efficient operation of the corporation. The motivating factor, however, was not
the effect which the issue would have upon the present financial condition of the
corporation, but the effect that possible future financial reverses would have upon a
corporation with an outstanding debt proportionately greater than that of other
similar corporations. Under an analogous approach, limitations of corporate indebted-
ness, enforced by director's liability statutes, might prove to be a stabilizing factor
in the modern economy.
Criminal Law-Obtaining Property by False Pretenses-Confidence Game-
[Illinois].-The defendant on several occasions obtained goods from the prosecuting
witness by falsely stating that the goods were being secured for the defendant's em-
ployer, each purchase being paid for when the immediately succeeding one was made.
At the time of the final purchase, the defendant said he would return the following
day to pay for the two unpaid purchases, but he neither returned nor made payment.
On writ of error from a judgment holding the defendant guilty of obtaining property
by means of the confidence game, held, that although the defendant may have been
guilty of obtaining property by false pretenses,' the evidence was insufficient to sus-
tain a confidence game conviction. 2 Judgment reversed. People v. Martin.3
The reversal in the instant case results from the difficulty in distinguishing be-
tween the related statutory crimes of obtaining property by false pretenses and by
means of a confidence game.4 False pretense statutes are essentially an extension of
23 In the Matter of Consumers Power Co., Holding Co. Act Rel. 1854 (1939), noted in
7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 735 (1940).
, Ill. Rev. Stat. ('939) c. 38, § 253: "Whoever, with intent to cheat or defraud another,
designedly by color of any false token or writing, or by any false pretense, obtains .... prop-
erty .... shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $2,ooo, and imprisoned not exceeding one
year .......
2 Th1. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 38, § 256: "Every person who shall obtain .... property ....
by means or by use of any false or bogus check or by any other means, instrument or device
commonly called the confidence game shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than
one year nor more than ten years."
3 372 Ill. 484, 24 N.E. (2d) 380 (I939).
4 In People v. Gould, 363 Ill. 348, 352, 2 N.E. (2d) 324, 326 (1936), the court impliedly
acknowledged the difficulty in distinguishing the crimes, stating: "the term 'confidence game'
can hardly be defined in a manner that will cover and segregate all cases of that nature from
those constituting the offense of obtaining money or property by false pretenses. Obviously,
false pretenses of some sort are employed in a confidence game."
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the common law crime of cheating by means of false tokens.s Generally, a false pre-
tense is defined as a designed misrepresentation of an existing condition, made with
intent to defraud, so that the party to whom the false misrepresentation is made is
induced thereby to part with title to and possession of his property. 6 The Illinois
confidence game act, 7 on the other hand, penalizes obtaining property "by use of any
false or bogus check or by any other means, instrument or device commonly called
a confidence game ..... " Though the generality of this wording offers no clear basis
for distinguishing the two crimes, Illinois decisions have asserted that the distinction
lies in the manner in which the fraud is accomplished.8 The confidence game is char-
acterized as a "swindling operation in which advantage is taken of the confidence
reposed by the victim in the swindler."9 The difficulty is that this so-called distin-
guishing feature of the confidence game can apply also to a false pretense; for in a
sense, it is only because the victim of the false pretenses has "confidence" in the mis-
representations that he parts with his property.
In several states having statutes which resemble those of Illinois,1o the crimes
have been distinguished on the basis that the confidence game requires, in addition
to a false statement, a visible token or object which serves as a medium for effectuat-
ing the fraud."x Although this distinction may be found in the Illinois cases, 2 it has
not been expressly recognized, and there have been confidence game convictions where
there had been no acts in addition to an oral or written misrepresentation.13 Another
distinction could be drawn by limiting the confidence game statute to promises or
representations of future occurrences, since the false pretense statute has been held
to cover only representations as to "past or existing facts."14 Yet the readiness
s False pretense statutes were enacted to cover the "gap" between the crimes of common law
cheating and larceny, Clark and Marshall, Crimes § 355 (3d ed. 1927); May, Crimes § 26o
(4th ed. 1938).
6 People v. Cohn, 358 Ill. 326, 193 N.E. 150 (1934); People v. Schneider, 327 Ill. 270, i58
N.E. 448 (1927); 2 Wharton, Criminal Law § 1399 (12th ed. 1932).
7 111. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 38, § 256.
' See People v. Drury, 335 Ill. 539, 167 N.E. 823 (1929); People v. Miller, 278 Ill. 490, i6
N.E. 131 (1917); People v. Gould, 363 Ill. 348, 2 N.E. (2d) 324 (1936).
9 People v. Gallowich, 283 Ill. 360, 363, ri9 N.E. 283, 284 (1918); People v. Warfield, 261
Ill. 293, IO3 N.E. 979 (1913); People v. Bimbo, 369 Ill. 618, 17 N.E. (2d) 573 (1938); People v.
Schachter, 361 II. 573, 198 N.E. 683 (1935).
10 See, e.g., Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 48, §§ 222 (confidence game), 226 (confidence
man defined), 3o5 (false pretense).
11 In Davis v. People, 96 Colo. 212, 40 P. (2d) 968 (1935), it was stated that the confidence
game "involves the use of some false or bogus means, token, symbol, or device as distinguished
from mere words, however false or fraudulent."
- Cases cited in note I8 infra.
13 People v. Angelica, 358 Ill. 621, 193 N.E. 6o6 (1934) (defendant pretended that he was
an officer, obtaining money from the victim as payment for preventing his arrest); People v.
Rosenbaum, 312 Ill. 3 30, 143 N.E. 859 (1924) (defendant obtained money by falsely pretend-
ing to be able to "fix" the sentence of victim's brother); People v. Keyes, 269 Ill. 173, 1o9 N.E.
684 (1915) (defendant obtained money from victim by falsely representing that victim was to
become a partner).
'4 See People v. Sullivan, 263 Ill. 34, r N.E. (2d) 206 (1936); People v. Cohn, 358 Ill. 326,
193 N.E. ISo (1934); People v. Martin, 372 Ill. 484, 24 N.E. (2d) 380 (1939).
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with which the courts have found elements of present representation in cases super-
ficially appearing to involve only promisess together with the rarity of cases in which
absolutely no representation of an existing fact is made,'6 renders the distinction of
little value.
In spite of the apparent coincidence of the two crimes, an analysis of the Illinois
cases reveals three criteria, the presence of which may indicate a proper confidence
game prosecution: (i) the employment of one or more accomplices;'? (2) the use of
some visible token, in addition to verbal misrepresentations; 8 and (3) the necessity
for numerous transactions to consuimmatetheswindle.'9 Applying the suggested criteria
to the instant case, the reversal seems justifiable. The defendant accomplished his
fraud unaided by confederates, he employed no false tokens, and he arguably re-
sorted to merely one fraudulent act to effect the swindle, since he had paid for all
former purchases.
While the suggested criteria may be readily applicable to the instant case, there
are numerous cases upholding confidence game convictions lacking one or more of the
tests.o Furthermore, several false pretense convictions have been founded on fact
s See People v. Sullivan, 263 Ill. 34, i N.E. (2d) 2o6 (1936) (defendant convicted of obtain-
ing by false pretenses, having failed to deliver specific furniture as promised); People v. Cohn,
358 Ill. 326, 193 N.E. 15o (1934) (defendant convicted of obtaining by false pretenses, having
falsely promised to obtain civil service positions for the payment of money). But see People v.
Austin, 63 Ill. App. 303 (1896).
16 In People v. Austin, 63 Il3. App. 303 (1896), the defendant, though grossly exaggerating
the capacities of a restaurant in which he purported to sell an interest, was held not guilty of
obtaining by false pretenses, there being no representation of an existing or past fact, but only
as to future capabilities. It would seem unlikely that the defendant could have been success-
fully prosecuted under the confidence game statute, since, in addition to the reason stated, the
court could have based its decision on the lack of proof of intent to defraud.
'7 In the following cases, one or more accomplices were employed: People v. Shepard, 358
Ill. 338, i93 N.E. 447 (1934); People v. Harrington, 310I111. 613, 142 N.E. 246 (1924); People
v. Miller, 278111.490, ii6 N.E. 131 (i9oo); People v. Brady, 272 Ill 401, 112 N.E. 126 (igi6);
People v. Poindexter, 243 Ill. 6i, 90 N.E. 261 (igog); Hughs v. People, 223 Ill. 417, 79 N.E.
137 (igo6); Chilson v. People, 224 Ill 535, 79 N.E. 934 (i9o6); DuBois v. People, 200 111. i57,
65 N.E. 658 (1902); People v. Van Eyck, 178 Ill. 199, 52 N.E. 852 (i899); Maxwell v. People,
158 Ill. 248, 41 N.E. 995 (1895).
18 People v. Bimbo, 369 Ill. 618, 17 N.E. (2d) 573 (1938) (gipsy costume and crystal ball);
People v. Shepard, 358 Ill. 338, 193 N.E. 447 (i934) (cards); People v. Poindexter, 243 Ill.
68, go N.E. 261 (igog) (false telegrams, letters); People v. De Pew, 237 Ill. 574, 86 N.E. io9o
(19o8) (samples of trinkets); People v. Van Eyck, 178 Ill. 199, 52 N.E. 852 (1899) (dice);
Maxwell v. People, i58 Ill. 248, 4X N.E. 995 (1895) (fake cards).
'9 Cases cited in note 20 infra. See also People v. Bimbo, 369 Ill. 618, 17 N.E. (2d) 573
(i938); People v. De Pew, 237 Ill. 574, 86 N.E. 1o9o (i9o8). It has been said that when the
confidence reposed in the accused has been built during a series of previous honest transac-
tions, as in the instant case, then the confidence game act is not applicable if a subsequent
swindle is perpetrated, People v. Gould, 363 Ill. 348, 2 N.E. (2d) 324 (1936), and cases therein
cited. But see People v. Brady, 272 Ill. 401, 112 N.E. 126 (1916); People v. Lager, 28811. 113,
123 N.E. 327 (i919); People v. Harrington, 3io Ill. 613, 142 N.E. 246 (1924).
20 In People v. Westrup, 372 Il1. 517, 25 N.E. (2d) 16 (i94o), the defendant, without ac-
complices, obtained money from the victim, simply by promising that the money was to be
used to purchase real estate to be resold at a profit, which was then to be divided between the
defendant and the victim. Several transactions, however, were necessary to consummate the
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situations which would, under the above analysis, support confidence game convic-
tions.2 The statutory particularization in Illinois of the false pretense crime, into
false pretense and confidence game crimes, may not be an attempt to punish conduct
which in the absence of the confidence game statute would go unpunished, but may
be an effort to punish more severely a certain type of conduct which might be char-
acterized as an "aggravated" false pretense. Thus, the confidence game is punishable
as a felony, 22 whereas obtaining by false pretenses is punishable as a misdemeanor.23
Such a statutory distinction in "degree" may be criticized because it produces an
inability in many cases to distinguish the two crimes, and as a result, (i) the accused,
as in the instant case, temporarily at least, secures his freedom; 24 (2) the new proceed-
ing necessitated by the improper indictment increases the expense of prosecution;
and (3) the criminal may be prosecuted under the false pretense statute because there
is greater likelihood of obtaining a conviction. These undesired effects could largely
be avoided by discarding the attempted particularization and by employing the in-
determinate sentence procedure as a means of providing more severe penalties for
conduct felt to be socially more reprehensible.2s It is submitted that this approach is
the better one because of the difficulty in distinguishing the two crimes in Illinois.26
Federal jurisdiction-Effect of Undetermined State Law-[Federal].-Oil having
been discovered near the right-of-way of a railroad undergoing reorganization under
section 77 of the. Bankruptcy Act,, the trustee in bankruptcy petitioned the court for
swindle. See also People v. Angelica, 258 Ill. 621, 134 N.E. 6o6 (1934), where the single de-
fendant, through use of several transactions, extracted money from the victim by falsely stat-
ing that he was an officer of the law and that he would prevent the victim's arrest from an
alleged crime. See also People v. Epstein, 338 Ill. 631, 17o N.E. 678 (1930).
2 In Och v. People, 124 Il1. 349, i6 N.E. 662 (1888), several city commissioners, engaging
in numerous transactions, extracted "commissions" from those contracting with the city, the
contractors reimbursing themselves by "padding" the bills (false tokens) which were then ap-
proved by the commissioners. It seems that a confidence game conviction could have been
sustained; cf. People v. Gruber, 362 l. 278, 200 N.E. 483 (1936); People v. Pouchot and Boyle,
174 I1. App. i (i912).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 38, § 256. 2Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 38, § 253.
24 People v. Gould, 363 Ill. 348, 2 N.E. (2d) 324 (1936); People v. Snyder, 327 Ill. 402, I58
N.E. 677 (1927); People v. Schneider, 327 11. 270, i58 N.E. 448 (1927); People v. Friedlander,
328 11. 35, i59 N.E. 187 (1927).
2s Compare the Illinois statute regarding mayhem, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 38, § 448, pro-
viding as a penalty imprisonment in the penitentiary from one to twenty years. "It shall be
deemed and taken as a part of every such sentence .... that the term of such imprisonment
or commitment may be terminated earlier than the maximum by the Department of Public
Welfare .... ," Indeterminate Sentence Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 38, § 802.
26 That such a variable penalty will be more desirable appears from the successful results
which Illinois has experienced under its homicide statute, which defines only two broad crimes:
murder, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 38, § 358, and manslaughter, Ill. Rev. Stat. (i939) c. 38, § 361.
Contrast the complexity of the Minnesota statute, which provides for three grades of murder,
Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) §§ oo67-68, 1007o, and manslaughter of the first and second
degree, Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) §§ 1077-78. See Cardozo, Law and Literature 99-IoI
(193): "I think the distinction is much too vague to be continued in our law .... I am not
at all sure that I understand it myself after trying to apply it for many years ......
' 47 Stat. 1474 (1933), I1 U.S.C.A. § 205 (1934).
